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STARE DECISIS AND CERTIORARI ARRIVE TO BRAZIL:
A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH
Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira
Nuno Garoupa*
ABSTRACT
Two important legal reforms in court procedure have taken place in Brazil
recently: simula vinculante (all courts now have to follow the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in similar cases) and requisito da repercussao geral (the
Supreme Court only hears cases that are of general importance). These two
procedural rules respond to a long debate in the Brazilian legal community on
how to address court congestion, the heavy workload of the Brazilian Supreme
Court, and the role of the higher courts in establishing case law. We discuss
the implications of these two important reforms from the comparative
perspective (by explaining the similarities and differences with U.S. law, in
particular stare decisis and the writ of certiorari) and from a law and
economics approach (the likely consequences in terms of incentives for the
Supreme Court, the court system, and the litigants more generally).
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INTRODUCTION
Two important far-reaching legal developments have taken place in Brazil
in the last couple of years. In contrast to the United States and the common law
world more generally, the Brazilian legal system lacked a general principle of
stare decisis and strong precedent. Traditionally, strong precedent is
nonexistent in civil law systems. The lack of strong precedent was particularly
significant in Brazil given the inclination of Brazilian judges to be legally
creative, and the numerous repetitive cases against governmental actions and
measures.2 At the same time, the absence of precedent reduced the power and
the influence of the Supreme Court over the entire judiciary.3 Finally, the
inexistence of formal precedent was perceived as a reason for court congestion,
frivolous appeals, and general delays in dispute resolution.4
Precedent has recently been emulated by the new simula vinculante.
Before the existence of stimula vinculante, courts could apply different legal
reasoning than that of the Supreme Court.6 Even when courts followed the
Supreme Court decisions, the previous system did not bar appeals, allowing
excessive and inefficient appeals, such as strategic appeals with the sole
purpose of postponing the enforcement of an unfavorable judgment. The new
Dana Stringer, Note, Choice of Law and Choice of Forum in Brazilian International Commercial
Contracts: Party Autonomy, International Jurisdiction, and the Emerging Third Way, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 959, 966 (2006).
2 Id. at 965-66.
Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Integrity Review of Brazil: Managing Risks for a
Cleaner Public Service 87 (2011).
4 [I
Introduced by Constitutional Amendment No. 45, the sumula vinculante is a one-sentence
pronouncement issued by the Brazilian Supreme Court, with binding effect to all other courts, which clearly
states the interpretation that the Brazilian Supreme Court has given to a constitutional issue after repeated
decisions on the same matter. See CONSTITUI(Ao FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] amend. 45, art. 102, para. 2.
For instance, Sfmula Vinculante N0 12 translates to, "Charging enrollment fees to students in public
universities violates article 206, IV, of the Federal Constitution." S.T.F., Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes,
14.8.2008, 2008, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.], 22.8.2008, 1, 1. By December 2012, the Brazilian
Supreme Court had issued thirty two sumulas vinculantes. List of Sumulas Vinculantes, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL
FEDERAL, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/jurisprudenciaSumulaVinculante/anexo/Enunciados Sumula
VinculanteSTF_1_a 29 31_e 32.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). See generally Maria Angela Jardim de
Santa Cruz Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: A Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U.
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 99, 138-45 (2006) (describing Constitutional Amendment No. 45 and the sumula
vinculante in greater detail).
6 Rogerio B. Arantes, Constitutionalism, the Expansion of Justice and the Judicialization of Politics in
Brazil, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 231, 251-52 (Rachel Seider et al. eds., 2005).
7 Id. at 251.
556 [Vol. 26
STARE DECISTS AND CERTIORARI ARRIVE TO BRAZIL
system has effectively changed the balance of power in favor of the Supreme
Court by enhancing its influence in establishing case law.8 In fact, the main
criticism of the new suimula vinculante system seems to be that it reduces
heterogeneity in legal doctrines across courts, therefore arguably impairing the
independence of the lower courts.9
At the same time, in contrast to the United States, the Brazilian Supreme
Court historically had little control over its docket because there was no
equivalent to the writ of certiorari. 10 Since 2007, a new requirement of
requisito de repercussdo geral--which translates to "general interest for
admission of extraordinary appeals"-has been in force, which could in
principle approximate the writ of certiorari." Enabling the Supreme Court to
select cases brings up questions about universal access to justice and possible
strategic control of the docket. 12
The legal implications of these two mechanisms, stimula vinculante and
requisito da repercussdo geral, can be extremely significant in a congested
court system and in a system where activism by lower courts has been
noticeably problematic in terms of legal certainty and effective application of
the law.13 However, these mechanisms raise interesting questions about the
internal balance of power between lower and higher courts. There are
important repercussions for the functioning of the Supreme Court, in terms of
influence in establishing legal doctrines and quashing inconsistent case law.
The Brazilian legal system has been under pressure for its perceived lack of
effectiveness. For example, the quality of the court system has been
8 Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., supra note 3, at 87-88.
9 See, e.g., Arantes, supra note 6, at 252 (stating that the new stmula vinculante has been criticized and
badly received by those sectors that want to use the courts strategically for political struggles or to avoid
expensive claims).
10 Cf. id. at 251.
1 Article 102, section 3 of Constitutional Amendment No. 45 provides that "[i]n an extraordinary appeal,
the appealing party must demonstrate the general repercussion of the constitutional issues discussed in the
case, under the terms of the law, so that the [Brazilian Supreme] Court may examine the possibility of
accepting the appeal, and it may only reject it through the opinion of two thirds of its members."
CONSTITUi(AO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] amend. 45, art. 102, para. 3 (emphasis added). As a
consequence, the law implementing Constitutional Amendment No. 45 limits the Court's jurisdiction to
appeals of general social, economic, political, or legal interest or impact. Lei No. 11 41 de 19 de Dezembro
de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 20 122006. If an appeal is not deemed to be of general
interest or to have general impact, review is immediately declined by the Court. Id. art. 2, §5.
12 See Arantes, supra note 6, at 251-52.
H See Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., supra note 3, at 87.
2012] 557
EMORY TNTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
documented by the World Bank as non-conducive to economic growth or
attracting more foreign direct investment.14 The two new mechanisms, stimula
vinculante and requisito da repercussdo geral, might be regarded as a serious
reform of procedure to promote more efficient courts and improve case law,
thus enhancing legal certainty.
Our paper makes three significant contributions. First, it explains to an
English-speaking audience these recent developments that can potentially
revolutionize the Brazilian legal system and which, in our view, have not yet
attracted the deserved attention among legal comparativists (in fact, there is no
good literature in English about these two recent developments).
Second, we provide a contextual analysis of these two mechanisms from a
comparative perspective, in particular by looking at the American principles of
stare decisis and writ of certiorari. Under the traditional common law doctrine
of stare decisis, judicial precedent is a source of law, while in civil law, at best,
case law is regarded as law de facto.'5 The doctrine of stare decisis has two
principles, namely that lower courts are bound by superior courts (vertical stare
decisis) and that higher courts are bound by their previous decisions
(horizontal stare decisis), both for the sake of equality, predictability and
legal certainty. In civil law systems, lower courts have freedom to depart from
decisions by superior courts.17 However, judicial precedent exists when
established by a significant number of decisions. For example, the French
jurisprudence constante, the German stcindige Rechtsprechung, the Italian
dottrina giuridica, and the Spanish doctrinajuridica create effective precedent
and allow appeal to the supreme court of a judicial decision that violates
established case law.'8
14 See WORLD BANK & INT L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS: ECONOMY PROFILE: BRAZIL, 89-94 (2012),
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%/ 20Business/Documents/Profiles/
Country/BRA.pdf
5 See Lewis A. Komhauser, Stare Decisis, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 509, 509 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
16 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (defining stare decisis, horizontal stare decisis, and
vertical stare decisis).
1 See D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Introduction to INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 2 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).
18 See Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 17, at 17, 50; Jean Carbonnier, Authorities in Civil Laiw:
France, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 91,
102 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974); cf Michele Taruffo & Massimo La Torre, Precedent in Italy, in
INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 17, at 141, 180-81; Alfonso Ruiz Miguel &
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The writ of certiorari is the mechanism by which the U.S. Supreme Court
allows a case adjudicated at a lower court to be reviewed for legal error. 19 Four
out of the nine justices have to be favorable to the writ.20 Higher courts in civil
law jurisdictions have much less control over their docket.21 Nevertheless,
most higher courts in civil law jurisdictions have developed procedural rules to
decline particular cases under well-defined circumstances. 22
Our Recent Development explains the important Brazilian developments in
the context of common law and civil law jurisdictions. The new stimula
vinculante is different from stare decisis and certainly more important than
related current civil law doctrines. The requisito da repercussao geral is not a
writ of certiorari but, at the same time, is more ambitious than the standard
practices in civil law higher courts.
We also emphasize the recent developments in Brazil from a Latin
American perspective. The problems faced by the Brazilian Supreme Court are
not significantly different from those faced in other jurisdictions such as
Argentina or Chile. A comparison of how precedent and control of the docket
has been addressed in those two countries is illustrative of alternative
solutions.23
Third, our Recent Development provides a law and economics perspective
of the advantages and disadvantages of these two legal developments, with a
special focus on the incentives for lawmaking for the Brazilian Supreme Court.
American law and economics literature provides important arguments to
support the existence of stare decisis and the writ of certiorari.24 We critically
summarize these arguments and assess them from the Brazilian perspective.
The period of time that has elapsed since the enactment of these two measures
also permits a more careful analysis of the new incentives.
Francisco J. La Porta, Precedent in Spain, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note
17, at 259, 272-73, 282 83.
19 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (9th ed. 2009).
20 See Rice v. Sioux City Mem'1 Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 192-211.
22 Jd
23 See Nuno Garoupa & Maria A. Maldonado, The Judiciary in Political Transitions: The Critical Role
of U.S. Constitutionalism in Latin America, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 526 (2011) for a general
framework concerning the functioning of Latin America Supreme Courts.
24 See infra Part IV.
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Part I of this Recent Development explains in detail the two legal
developments, simula vinculante and requisito da repercussdo geral. Part 11
summarizes the comparative literature on precedents and mechanisms of
certiorari. Part III introduces the law and economics perspective on legal
precedents and certiorari. Part IV analyzes the stmula vinculante and the
requisito da repercussdo geral using the comparative literature and law and
economics frameworks. We provide concluding remarks in Part V.
1. THE NEW LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS TN BRAZIL
A. Simula Vinculante
The Brazilian Supreme Court's constitutional adjudication encompasses
both the U.S. concrete (or decentralized) model of judicial review, as well as
the European abstract (or centralized) model of constitutional review.25
Although the binding effect of the Supreme Court decisions has been in place
under abstract constitutional review since 1993,26 the lack of binding effect of
concrete judicial review has produced backlogs and overwhelmed the Court's
docket.27
After extensive debate on judicial reform in Brazil, Constitutional
Amendment No. 45 introduced the stmula vinculante (meaning "binding
pronouncement"), which endows the Supreme Court with the power of
concrete constitutional adjudication with a binding effect.28 Conceived by
Justice Victor Nunes Leal,29 the stmula was initially envisioned as a one-
sentence pronouncement created by the Supreme Court in the 1960s to inform
judges and lawyers about the Court's legal interpretation regarding repeat
decisions in multiple individual claims on the same subject matter.o
25 See Oliveira, supra note 5, at 115-34, for a discussion of the centralized and decentralized models of
judicial review.
26 CONSTITUImAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] amend. 3, art. 102, para. 2 (1993) (Braz.). This
arrangement follows the Gernman model closely. See Oliveira, supra note 5, at 127.
27 See id. at 111.
28 See infra note 5.
29 Justice Victor Nunes Leal (1914-1985) served on the Supreme Court from 1960 to 1969 when he was
in effect ousted by the military dictatorship under Ato Institucional N' 5, which imposed upon him compulsory
retirement. Biografia, INSTITUTO VICTOR NUNES LEAL, http://www.ivnl.com.br/index.phploption com
content&view-article&id 1O&Ttemid-40 (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
30 Oliveira, supra note 5, at 110-11. Starting in 1964, to expedite judgments of similar questions over
which the Court had already decided, the Supreme Court issued 736 stimulas. See List of Sumulas, SUPREMO
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/jurisprudenciaSumula/anexo/Sumula do STF 1-a
560 [Vol. 26
STARE DECISTS AND CERTIORARI ARRIVE TO BRAZIL
Essentially, a suimula consisted of a one-sentence pronouncement with no
binding effect but with persuasive authority.31 It was used for expediting
judgments on similar questions that had been already decided by the Court, and
for discouraging appeals that contradicted the simula.32 The persuasive
authority of the stmula was likely to induce legal certainty and reduce
unpredictability for parties involved in litigation. 33 A practical consequence in
the Court's operating procedures was that, if a simula was applicable to a case,
the Court was excused from writing an extensive opinion explaining its legal
reasoning. 34 The first batch of stmulas was issued in 1964, as Table One
shows.
Table One: Simulas without binding effect35
Szimulas Publication Date
I to 370 March 1964
371 to 404 May 12, 1964
405 to 438 July 6, 1964
439 to 472 October 10, 1964
473 to 551 December 10, 1969
552 to 600 January 3, 1977
601 to 621 October 29, 1984
623 to 736 October 9, 2003
It is unclear why no stmulas were issued between 1984 and 2003.36 In 2003,
Justice Sepulveda Pertence presented new proposals to the court en banc, and
113 simulas were approved. 7 After 2004, however, it is very unlikely that the
736.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). The last batch of persuasive sinmulas were issued in 2003. 1d. at 260-74.
Due to the smula 's pedagogical and informative character, lower courts and even the Attorney General's
office (Advocacia-Geral da Unido) started issuing their own sumulas to guide judges and government
attorneys on controversial issues, as well as to expedite the proceedings of similar cases. See, e.g., SmIulas,
ADVOCACIA-GERAL DA UNIAO, http://www.agu.gov.br/sistemas/site/Paginaslntemas/Normasinternas/Listar
Atos.aspxTTPO FILTRO=Sumulas (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
31 Oliveira, supra note 5, at 1 10- 11.
32 See id. at 111.
n See id.
34 See id.
35 See List of Sumulas, supra note 30 (listing each sumula and its publication date).
36 See Justice Jose Paulo Sepulveda Pertence, Remarks at the SFC Plenary Session (Aug. 28, 2003)
(transcript on file with authors) (discussing the sumulas).
37 Id.
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Supreme Court will ever again issue any other traditional siimulas due to the
advent of the suimula vinculante.
Constitutional Amendment No. 45 authorized the Supreme Court to issue
stmulas vinculantes, that is, pronouncements with binding effect.38 Such
pronouncements have binding effect not only on lower courts, but also on the
federal, state, and municipal administrations.39 As a result, once a stmula
vinculante is enacted, there is no need for similar cases to go all the way to the
Supreme Court to decide the issue, because lower courts are required to
automatically apply the Supreme Court ruling.40 It also bars appeals based on
arguments contrary to the suimula vinculante.41 Consequently, the result should
be that the Supreme Court's docket will not be overwhelmed with multiple
similar cases, thus reducing its backlog and contributing to a quicker and more
uniform disposition of cases.
This new mechanism aims to settle controversial issues that have raised
serious legal uncertainty and brought about multiple similar cases on the same
question. 42 Because of the exceptional character of the binding effect of
judicial decisions in traditional civil law jurisdictions, the Brazilian
Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote of Supreme Court justices to
approve, modify, or annul a szimula vinculante through a special proceeding. 43
The Brazilian Supreme Court may sua sponte propose the enactment of a
szimula vinculante.44  Also, certain government actors or non-political
individuals45 may file a proposal of sfimula vinculante to the Supreme Court.46
3 CONSTITI o FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] amend. 45, art. 102, para. 2.
40 Anna Bruno Silva, Bringing Uniformity to Brazilian Court Decisions: Looking at the American
Precedent and at Italian Living Law, ELEC. J. CoMP. L. 3-4 (December 2007), http://www.ejcl.org/i 14/artl 14-
3.pdf
4 id. at 5.
42 Id. at 7 (citing J. ANCHIETA DA SILVA, A SUMULA DE EFEITO VINCULANTE AMPLO NO DIREITO
BRASILEIRO 60 (1998)).
43 CONSTITiCko FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSITUTION1 amend. 45, art. 102, para. 3.
44 See Lei No. 11 417 art 2. de 19 de Dezembro de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U] de
20.12.2006.
45 See id. art. 3. Article 3 of Lei No. 11,417 lists those who have standing to request the enactment,
review, or annulment of a sdmula vinculante the President of Brazil, the directing boards of the Senate, the
Chamber of Deputies, and the state legislative assemblies; the Attorney General; the Federal Council of the
Brazilian Bar Association; the Federal Public Defender; any political party represented in the Brazilian
Congress; any confederation of labor unions; any national professional association; any state governor;
superior courts; federal and state appellate courts; and municipalities in which concrete cases are being
litigated. Id.
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Furthermore, during the proceedings, third parties may offer briefs to express
their views on the subject matter.47
Different from the stare decisis doctrine of the U.S. system, which endows
all U.S. Supreme Court rulings with the force of precedent, the Brazilian
simula vinculante confers binding effect on selected issues that have multiple
lawsuits on the same question and only after reiterated decisions of the
Brazilian Supreme Court.48 Once approved, the szmula vinculante has
immediate effect.49 The Brazilian Supreme Court may, however, restrict the
binding effect or decide that the effects take place at some other time based on
exceptional public interest and legal certainty considerations.50 So far, the
Supreme Court has issued thirty two suimulas vinculantes which are easily
available online to the general public. Table Two summarizes the publication
dates of the current suimulas vinculantes.
Table Two: Szmulas Vinculantes
Sfimulas Vinculantes Publication Date
Ito 3 June 6, 2007
4 to 6 May 9, 2008
7 and 8 June 20, 2008
June 20, 2008
(republished June 26, 2008)
10 June 27, 2008
11 and 12 August 22, 2008
13 August 29, 2008
14 February 9, 2009
15 and 16 July 1, 2009
17 to 21 November 10, 2009
22 to 24 December 11, 2009
25 to 27 December 23, 2009
46 id
47 Id. art. 3, §2.
48 Silva, supra note 40, at 3.
49 id.
50 Karina Aineida Amarel, A stimula vinculante e sua influencia sobre o acesso a justiga constitucional
no Brasil [Binding Precedent and Its influence on Access to Constitutional Justice in Brazil], 15 SCIENTIA
IuRis 75, 79-80 (2011) (Braz.).
51 List of Sumulas Vinculantes, supra note 5.
52 id.
2012] 563
EMORY TNTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
28 to 31 February 17, 2010
32 February 24, 2011
The binding effect of the simula vinculante may seem to have, at first glance,
a narrower span than the U.S. doctrine of precedent, because it applies only to
selected constitutional questions brought before the Brazilian Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, the potential scope of the suimula vinculante may be much
broader than the U.S. Supreme Court stare decisis doctrine. To illustrate,
consider Sfimula Vinculante No 2, which stipulates that any state law or
regulation on drawing lots or sweepstakes, including bingos and lotteries, is
53
unconstitutional. The text of Sfimula Vinculante No 2 does not refer to any
specific legislation, so it can be applied in relation to any existing or future
regulation on bingos or lotteries in all states.54 The Brazilian stmula vinculante
is different from the American stare decisis doctrine in that the enouncement is
a general statement in the abstract, which gives much more flexibility and
leeway in terms of application, while the U.S. stare decisis doctrine implies
that a similar set of facts or circumstances have to be met.
Precedents established by the U.S. Supreme Court bind other states even
when they are not a party to a lawsuit.55 However, these precedents are decided
in the context of concrete review. In Brazil, the Supreme Court exercises both
concrete and abstract review. In an abstract enouncement, the siumula
vinculante theoretically indicates that the Supreme Court has a broader
opening in deciding on alleged violations of its content, because the Brazilian
judge does not have to assess whether the facts of the case are distinguishable
from those of the cases that originated the stmula vinculante. Therefore, the
abstract nature of the stmula vinculante enouncement, in principle, makes it
easier for a judge to apply the enouncement without a thorough and detailed
assessment of whether all facts of the cases are alike. However, whether this
possible broader interpretation will actually come to fruition remains to be
5 Snuila Vinculante No. 2, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencial
listarJurisprudencia. asp~sl 2.NUME. %20E%20S.FLSV.&base baseSumulasVinculantes (last visited Oct. 22,
2012).
54 i.
5 States that are not before the United States Supreme Court are also bound by its decisions. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that the state of Arkansas was bound by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, and thus could not choose to ignore the precedent set by Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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seen. 5 Abstract review is much broader than concrete review since abstract
review refers to all possible applications of a given law in all possible
imaginable situations, whereas concrete review refers to one possible
application in the one given situation before the court.57
Another distinctive feature of the Brazilian system is that the stmula
vinculante not only applies to Brazilian lower federal and state courts, but also
to federal, state, and municipal administrative agencies. Therefore, a party in
an administrative proceeding before a government agency may invoke the
application of a suimula vinculante and the agency must explain whether or not
it applies to the plaintiffs case.59 In case of denial, after the exhaustion of
administrative proceedings, the plaintiff may file a direct request to the
Supreme Court which, if a violation of the suimula vinculante is found, will
order the agency to adjust its decisions to similar cases, under penalty of civil,
administrative, and criminal liability.60 Indeed, this system provides
individuals with direct access to the Supreme Court for redress of violations of
the stmula vinculante by government agencies.
B. Requisito da Repercussdo Geral
The new requirement of requisito da repercussdo geral that emulates the
writ of certiorari was created by Constitutional Amendment No. 45. This new
mechanism seems to finally provide the necessary tools to make the Brazilian
Supreme Court more efficient and available to focus on meritorious cases in
order to accomplish its institutional mission to safeguard the Constitution.
56 Whether the Brazilian Supreme Court will apply the snmla vinculante restrictively or loosely depends
on the complaints of violation that reach the Court in the future. Only after the Court receives a significant
number of these complaints will any concrete assessment on this topic be possible.
57 We do accept that the United States Supreme Court could, in principle, extend the ratio decidendi to a
point that concrete review turns into abstract review and these differences are blurred. Cf Alec Stone, The
Birth and Development of Abstract Review: Constitutional Courts and Policymaking in Western Europe, 19
POL'Y STUD. J. 81, 88 (1990). However, we do not share the view that such possibility has been effectively
followed by the United States Supreme Court.
58 See CONSTITuilAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] amend. 45, art. 102, para. 2. The impact on
federal, state, and municipal administrative agencies is particularly important and economically relevant since
a significant percentage of the cases entertained by the Brazilian Supreme Court involve the state as either
defendant or plaintiff. Carolina Arlota & Nuno Garoupa, Addressing Federal Conflicts An Empirical Analysis
ofthe Brazilian Supreme Court, 1988 2010 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
59 See Lei No. 11 417 art 8, de 19 de Dezembro de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U] de
20.12.2006.
60 ld
61 CONSTITUIAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] amend. 45, art. 102, para. 3.
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Before elaborating on this new mechanism, we should not give the
impression that this was the first time that a similar mechanism to the writ of
certiorari was envisioned. Historically, there have been attempts to restrict the
admissibility of extraordinary appeals to the Brazilian Supreme Court. During
the military dictatorial regime (1964-1985), Constitutional Amendment No. 1
(October 1969) allowed the Supreme Court to prescribe in its internal rules
requirements for extraordinary appeals.62 As a result, in 1975, the Supreme
Court introduced in its internal rules the "relevant federal issue" requirement,63
which was later explicitly included in the Constitution by Constitutional
Amendment No. 7.64 Inspired by the writ of certiorari, this requirement
introduced the Supreme Court's discretion in adjudicating cases, whereby
extraordinary appeals were only admissible if the Court considered the federal
question at issue to be relevant. Although a salutary advancement in
controlling the Court's docket and limiting procrastinatory appeals, this
innovation was perceived as authoritarian and non-democratic, due to the
subjectivity and imprecision as to what could be considered relevant. 6 This
mechanism was later eliminated when the new Constitution of 1988 created a
separate court of last resort for federal questions as an attempt to address the
burdensome caseload of the Supreme Court.67
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court caseload kept gradually increasing after
1988. The Supreme Court received 21,328 fillings in 1988, which climbed to
127,535 fillings in 2006, with a peak of 160,453 fillings in 2002.6 The
Supreme Court tried to cope with the increasing number of fillings by
imposing strict formal requirements through jurisprudential construction as a
means to avoid frivolous and proscratinatory appeals (a standard approach in
civil law jurisdictions). An example of this defensive case law was the Court's
interpretation that extraordinary appeals would only be admissible if the
62 Constitui5o da Republica Federativa do Brasil [Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil],
Jan. 24, 1967, amend. 1, art. 119(111) (superseded by the 1988 Constitution).
6, See id. amend. 7, art. 119(111) § 1 see also Fatima Nancy Andrighi, Minister of the Superior Court of
Justice, Speech at the Superior Court of Justice 1-2 (October 16, 2000) (transcript available at http:/bdjur.stj.
gov.br/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2011/633/Arguigao Relevancia.pdflsequence-4).
64
65 Andrighi, supra note 63, at 2.
66 Cf id. at 4.
6 See CONSTImIAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-A. The Superior Tribunal de Justiga was
created with thirty-three justices in 1988. Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira & Nuno Garoupa,
Choosing Judges in Brazil: Reassessing Legal Transplants from the United States, 59 AM. J. CoMP. L. 529,
538 (2011).
61 See infra tbl. 3.
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alleged constitutional violation had already been brought at the appellate court
level. 69 Regardless of such attempts, the number of cases brought before the
Supreme Court kept increasing. The caseload of the Supreme Court was
inundated with multiple cases on similar questions, overburdening the Court
and demanding longer waiting periods for litigating parties.70
With such an astonishing caseload, reforming the Supreme Court was
paramount. During judicial reform talks, the idea of having a mechanism like
the writ of certiorari grew stronger as a technique to achieve a more efficient
and steadfast judiciary in Brazil by reducing the cases that would reach the
Supreme Court and strengthening lower court decisions.7 1
Within this context, Constitutional Amendment No. 45 enacted the new
requirement of requisito da repercussdo geral whereby the Supreme Court
may find extraordinary appeals inadmissible for lack of relevancy by a two-
thirds vote of its members.72 In response to previous criticism against
discretionary jurisdiction, Constitutional Amendment No. 45 deferred to the
legislature to define what can be considered relevant. Therefore, in 2006, Lei
No. 11,418 clarified that the Supreme Court will consider whether a
constitutional question is relevant from an economic, political, social, or legal
viewpoint, if the importance transcends the parties' subjective interests in the
litigation.
By itself, this general importance test should not expedite proceedings
because this test does not directly impact the number of cases reaching the
Supreme Court. The Court still needs to analyze each individual case to declare
whether or not the issues are relevant. Nevertheless, a very interesting aspect
of this new requirement pertains to the use of technology in courts. In deciding
whether a constitutional issue is of general importance, the Supreme Court
uses an electronic voting system, called the plenario virtual (which translates
69 Andrea Metne Arnaut, Recursos Extraordinarios: Prequestionamento e Prestagdo Jurisdicional
Incompleta, PROCURADORIA GERAL DO ESTADO DE SAO PAOLO, http://www.pge.sp.gov.br/centrodeestudos/
bibliotecavirtual/regulariza2/doutrina8.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). This interpretation is commonly
known as requisito doprequestionamento, which translates to "previous questioning" requirement. Id
70 Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments under the 1988 Constitution, 7 Sw. JL. &
TRADE AM. 291, 291 (2000).
71 Cf Arantes, supra note 6, at 250-52.
72 CONSTITUcAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSITUTION1 amend. 45, art. 102, para. 3.
73 See Lei No. 11 418 art 2. de 19 de Dezembro de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U] de
20.12.2006.
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to "virtual plenary"). 74 Once the rapporteur electronically votes whether a case
has general importance or not, the remaining justices will have twenty days to
also electronically vote on this preliminary requirement.75 The vote is "yes" or
"no," without providing further reasoning, and is available for public view on
the Court's website.76 This electronic voting system facilitates the decision-
making process, and responds to previous concerns raised during the judicial
reform talks that this new test would burden the Court's proceedings and
provoke delays.
The most interesting feature of this new mechanism, however, is that it
impacts the functioning of multiple individual cases with similar claims. In
these cases, the lower courts, instead of sending all extraordinary appeals to the
Supreme Court, will select one or more cases that are representative of the
constitutional controversy, and stay the remaining ones until the Supreme
Court decides on the issue. If the Supreme Court finds that the constitutional
issue is not relevant, this decision will be applied to all appeals with an
identical question and the remaining related appeals in both the lower courts
and the Supreme Court will automatically be considered as non-admissible.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court resolves that the constitutional
question is relevant and decides the case on the merits, the lower courts will
themselves apply the Supreme Court ruling to the related appeals.79 The
Supreme Court may, in deciding a relevant constitutional question, admit third
parties to express their views on the case, as spontaneous amici curiae
submissions.80
74 See Plendrio Virtual [V irtual Plenary], SuPRE1mo TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://stfjus.br/portal/
jurisprudenciaRepercussaoGeral/listarProcessosJulgamento. asp (last visited July 27, 2012).
75 Emenda Regimental No 21, de 30 de Abril de 2007, REGIMENTO INTERNO DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL
FEDERAL [R.I.S.T.F.] (Braz.), available at http://www.stfjus.br/portal/ems/verTexto.aspservico=
jurisprudenciaRepercussaoGeral&pagina-regulamentacao (amending Article 324 of the Reginento Interno do
Supreno Tribunal Federal).
76 See, e.z, Plenario Virtual, supra note 74.
77 See Lei No. 11,418 art. 2, de 19 de Dezembro de 2006, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
20.12.2006.
78 i
79 id.
80 id. For more detail on the role of amici curiae before the Brazilian Supreme Court, see Andre Pires
Gontijo & Christine Oliveira Peter da Silva, 0 Papel do Anicus Curiae no Estado Constitucional: Mecanismo
de Acesso de Transdisciplinaridade no Processo de Tomada de Decisao Constitucional [The Role ofAnicus
Curiae on Constitutional State: Mechanism of Transdisciplinary Access on Constitutional Decision-Making
Process], in ANAIS DO XIX ENCONTRO NACIONAL DO CONPEDI DIREITOS FUNDAENTAIS E
TRANSDISCIPLINARIDADE 84 (Encontro Nacional do CONPEDI ed., 2010), available at http://www.conpedi.
org.br/manaus/arquivos/anais/fortaleza/Integra.pdf
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This general importance test, along with the particular proceedings of
identical cases in lower courts, has strongly impacted the Supreme Court
docket from 2007, when this mechanism was first implemented. The highest
percentage of the docket of the Supreme Court relates to its extraordinary
appellate jurisdiction. ' This concrete judicial review attribution encompasses
extraordinary appeals (recursos extraordindrios) and interlocutory appeals
against the denial of admissibility of extraordinary appeals (agravos de
instrumento), both of which amount to 95.3% of the Court's docket in 2006,
88.7% in 2008, 76.9% in 2010, and 54.9% in 2011.82 Table Three, below,
shows a sharp decline in the Court's docket since the mechanisms of simula
vinculante and requisito da repercussdo geral entered into force in 2007. From
2007 to 2008, there was a 40.8% decrease in the number of cases accepted by
the Supreme Court, followed by a 36.1 % falloff in 2009. In 2010, the variation
in relation to 2009 was only 4.0% which, together with a 7 .1% decrease in
2011, may indicate stabilization in the number of cases accepted, after the
initial impact of these new mechanisms.
Table Three: Statistics of the Supreme Court docket since 198883
Year Number of filings Number of cases Number of
(processos protocolados) accepted (distribuidos) judgments
1988 21,328 18,674 16,313
1989 14,721 6,622 17,432
1990 18,564 16,226 16,449
1991 18,438 17,567 14,366
1992 27,447 26,325 18,236
1993 24,377 23,525 21,737
1994 24,295 25,868 28,221
1995 27,743 25,385 34,125
1996 28,134 23,883 30,829
1997 36,490 34,289 39,994
1998 52,636 50,273 51,307
1999 68,369 54,437 56,307
2000 105,307 90,839 86,138
81 RE e A - % Distribuiqdo, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://www.stf jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.
asp?servico estatistica&pagina=REATProcessoDistribuido (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
82 Id
83 Movimnento Processual, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://www.stf jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?
servico-estatistica&pagina-movimentoProcessual (last visited July 27, 2012).
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2001 110,771 89,574 109,692
2002 160,453 87,313 83,097
200384 87,186 109,965 107,867
2004 83,667 69,171 101,690
2005 95,212 79,577 103,700
2006 127,535 116,216 110,284
2007 119,324 112,938 159,522
2008 100,781 66,873 130,747
2009 84,369 42,729 121,316
2010 71,670 41,014 103,869
2011 64,018 38,109 97,380
Table Four summarizes the Court's statistics concerning the application of the
requisito da repercussdo geral. The figures are remarkably stable in the period
2008-2011.
Table Four: Requisito da Repercussdo Gera 5
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Cases filed
with a
preliminary 4.792 25.942 21.410 22,643 25,497 100,284
request for
repercussao
geral
Issues
analyzed 20 126 99 119 157
under a
standard of Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 521
repercussdo
geral 14 6 99 27 67 32 81 38 116 41
Cases with
repercussdo
geral 0 27 26 19 38 110
decided on
the merits
84 The decline of lawsuits from 2002 to 2003 was due to thousands of requests for desistance of appeals
(all discussing similar questions on the national severance-pay fund) after an agreement was reached. For
detailed information on this event, see Oliveira, supra note 5, at 113-14.
85 Nfmeros da Repercussdo Geral, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://stfjus.br/portal/ems/verTexto.
asp?servico jurisprudenciaRepercussaoGeral&pagina-nuneroRepercussao (last visited July 27, 2012). Note
that the 2007 column only pertains to the Court's second semester of 2007. Id.
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11. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRECEDENTS AND CERTIORARI
A. General Overview
The simplest definition of legal precedent is that future judges are bound by
decisions in prior cases, vertically (lower courts are bound by the decisions of
superior courts) and horizontally (higher courts are bound by their previous
decisions). 8 Furthermore, courts are obliged to follow precedent even when
they think the outcome is not correct. In other words, the obligation to follow
precedent applies even if it instructs a judge to reach what it is not commonly
understood as the right decision.
There are several important consequences of establishing a legal system
bound by precedent. Precedent applies to similar cases. Hence, courts need to
develop rules to distinguish cases (if precedent applies to a "similar" case, a
court needs to define "similarity" in a consistent way) and to determine
reasoning (ratio decidendi) to be applied in similar cases by all judges.8 8 At the
same time, there must be legal rules to frame and regulate possible departures
from precedent. The standard approach is that a judge who wants to depart
from a previous precedent carries the burden of proof.89 When the rules of
departure are extremely limited and heavily constrained, we have an absolute
precedent. 90 Conversely, when those rules are more generous and flexible,
- - 91precedent is no longer strictly binding; it is merely indicative or persuasive.
The interaction of precedent and the rules regulating departure and
distinguishing cases allows for a more complex contour of the legal
86 See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING
37 (2009); Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003); Charles
J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401,
402 n.6 (1988); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 664 n.84 (1999); E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21
WAYNE L. REV. 1043, 1043-44 (1975). See generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the situation where a court is constrained by a precedent it considers incorrect);
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994)
(discussing the doctrine of hierarchical precedent); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987)
(presenting a comprehensive theoretical discussion of the doctrine of precedent).
87 See Wise, supra note 86, at 1044.
88 See Aleksander Peczenik, The Binding Force of Precedent, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 17, at 461, 462-64.
89 See Schauer, supra note 86, at 587.
90 See id at 592.
9' See id. at 592-93.
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92implications. Three possible approaches to precedent are usually considered.
The strictest form is absolute precedent, formally binding, and with few
possibilities for departure. 93 The next form is flexible precedent, not formally
binding but having the force of persuasion that effectively constrains courts. 94
Finally, the weakest form is merely a supportive statement that courts should
consider when deciding a case. 95 Whereas the strictest form is usually
associated with Anglo-American stare decisis, the weakest form is more
common in civil law jurisdictions.96 For example, in France, it is known that a
judgment based on a precedent but lacking a code source is not lawful.97
The legal understanding of stare decisis has evolved in the common law
world.98 Precedent did not exist before the seventeenth century due to lack of
information and knowledge about case law decided by other courts. 99 Since
then, over time, the binding force of the case law developed by the higher
courts was recognized. oo
In the United States, stare decisis follows the hierarchical structure of
courts. The U.S. Supreme Court as well as state supreme courts have expressed
their power to overrule precedent.101 U.S. courts also tend to depart when they
consider precedent outdated, if it produces undesirable results or if it is based
-102
on poor legal reasoning.
In Britain, before Beamish v. Beamishios and London Tramways Company
v. London County Council,104 courts were influenced but not strictly bound by
precedent. After these landmark decisions, the absolutism of stare decisis was
set and imposed accordingly, as was reaffirmed Admiralty Commissioners v.
92 Peczenik, supra note 88, at 463.
9-' Id.
9 Id.
95 Id.
96 Cf id. at 463-64.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
98 See J. DAVID MURPHY & ROBERT RUETER, STARE DECISIS IN COMMONWEALTH APPELLATE COURTS
1-4(1981).
99 See Wise, supra note 86, at 1048.
100 Cf Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and The Value of Precedent: A Comparative and
Empirical Study ofa Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 784-86 (2005).
101 Id. at 786.
102 Id.: see also James F. Spriggs, 11 & Thomas G. Hansford, The U.S. Supreme Court's Incorporation
and Interpretation ofPrecedent, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 139, 154-55 (2002).
10' [1861], IX H.L.C. 274, 338 39; see also MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, at 3.
104 [1898], A.C. 375 (H.L.) (Westlaw); see also MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, at 3.
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Valverda.1os Notwithstanding, British courts were still faced with a significant
question concerning if a fundamental principle should prevail over precedent.
This legal issue was addressed inconclusively in London Transport Executive
v. Betts o0 and later in Myers v. Director ofPublic Prosecutions.107 In 1966, the
House of Lords issued a well-known Practice Statement (developed later by
case law) that abolished the rigid adherence to precedent and introduced the
possibility of departing from previous precedent when it is correct to do so. os
However, the English Court of Appeal is subject to absolute stare decisis with
few exceptions as explained by Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company.109 This
principle has generally been upheld, as it was in Farrell v. Alexander.110
In Canada, departure from precedent was considered exceptional under
Stuart v. The Bank of Montreal."' The principle remained unchanged until
Binus v. The Queen,112 when it was allowed under "compelling reasons"
(although precedents established by the Privy Council have not been formally
binding since 1957). 113 Since then, it has been clarified that the Canadian
Supreme Court is not bound by stare decisis. 114 Provincial supreme courts have
evolved to follow similar flexible models, possibly with the late exception of
the Ontario Court of Appeal. 15
In Australia, there have been questions about the binding use of English
precedents since the 1940s. 16 English precedents no longer formally bind
Australian courts, although as a matter of practice, Australian courts frequently
use English decisions. The New Zealand Court of Appeal has taken a similar
position. 1 8 Both the Australian High Court and the New Zealand Court of
15 [1938], A.C. 173, 194-95 (Westlaw); see also MURPHY & RUETER, Supra note 98, at 5.
106 [1959], A.C. 213, 232 (Westlaw); see also MURPHY & RUETER, Supra note 98, at 6.
107 [1965], A. C. 1001, 1021 see also MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, at 6.
108 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966], 1 W.L.R. 1234 (Westlaw); see also MURPHY &
RUETER, supra note 98, at 6-7.
109 [1944], 1 K.B. 718; see also MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, at 43.
"o [1976] 31 P. & C.R. 1, 11 see also MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, at 15.
. [1909], 41 S.C.R. 516, 535 (Can.), affd [1911] A.C. 120; see also MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98,
at 19-20.
112 Binus v. The Queen [1967], S.C.R. 594, 601 (Can.); see also MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, at 22.
1 Andrew Heard, Canadian Independence, SIMON FRASER UNIv. n.50, http://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/324/
Independence.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
114 Cf MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, 19-55.
115 Id. at 24.
116 Id. at 57.
1 Id. at 57-58.
.. Id. at 66.
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Appeal struggle to foster uniformity of common law and statutory concepts,
therefore drawing on many occasions from decisions of the Privy Council, the
House of Lords, and the Supreme Court of Canada.119
Another relevant example is Singapore. The Singaporean Court of Appeal
decided that the decisions of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom no
longer bind in 1992.120 However, English law tends to be followed defacto.121
Some mixed jurisdictions do not seem to depart from the English
understanding of stare decisis. In Scotland, the judicial practices were
developed in analogous ways to the English after the 18th century.122 There is
judicial precedent binding in all Scottish courts, in a manner not very different
from English courts.123 Although there has been controversy in South Africa,
the predominant view seems to be that South African law contains an
"undeniable infusion of English law."l24 In other mixed jurisdictions such as
Louisiana and Quebec, the common law doctrine of stare decisis does not
apply.125 Judicial precedents are merely a persuasive source of law, a binding
authority weaker than stare decisis.126 However, some legal scholars point out
that this makes little practical difference.127 Other legal scholars refer to a
"systemic respect for jurisprudence". 128
11 See Simon Bronitt, Australia, in HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 50, 53 (Kevin Jon
Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011).
120 Eugene K.B. Tan, Law and Values in Governance: The Singaporean Way, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 91, 96
(2000) (citing Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1994] 2 S.L.R 689).
121 See id.; see also Eugene KB Tan, 'We' v '': Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4 AUSTRL. J.
ASIAN L. 1, 23 n.22 (2002).
122 See David M. Walker, Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Scots Law, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS, Supra note 18, at 202, 202.
123 See id. at 209-11.
124 Ellison Kahn, The Role of Doctrine and Judicial Decisions in South African Law, in THE ROLE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 18, at 224, 224;
accord id at 236.
125 See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Lawi Tradition: Archaic or Prophetic in the
Tventy-First Century?, 63 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002); Catherine Valcke, Quebec Civil Law and Canadian
Federalism, 21 YALE J INT'L L. 67, 84 (1996).
126 According to Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, in THE ROLE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 18, at 38, 49, this
is partly because civil law is useful to enable judges to seek justice by applying jurisprudential reason to
particular cases. The declaratory value of precedent has been driven in Louisiana by the self-interest of legal
academics, but also by judges who seem to favor the return to primary sources. Id. at 39-40, 55.
127 See, e.g., Jean-Louis Baudouin, The Impact of the Common Laiw on the Civilian Systems of Louisiana
and Quebec, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS,
supra note 18, at 1, 1 22. Baudoin's thesis is that courts in Quebec and Louisiana pass judgments using a
common-law format: they develop interpretation of the civil code with the same rules applied to the
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The Commonwealth literature points to unresolved issues in stare decisis.
In particular, the hierarchy of decisions of different-sized panels and the
precedential effect of "split court" decisions are unclear.129 The same literature
reflects the advantages and disadvantages of the current interpretation of stare
decisis.130 On the plus side, legal scholars mention the legal certainty and
predictability generated by precedent, acknowledgment that change of law
should be done by the legislature and not the courts, and belief that potential
correction of errors should be allocated to the highest court and not to the
lower courts.131 On the minus side, the standard arguments include absurdity
and injustice in many decisions, and the significant costs imposed due to the
legal charade of identifying differences across cases to avoid precedent.132
Finally, legal scholars have recognized that the progressive development and
application of fundamental principles requires a weaker role for precedent,
which is inconsistent with strict adherence to stare decisis.133
Case law is a primary source of law in the common law, while in the civil
law world, codes provide the fundamental law, statutes further develop the
codes, and courts merely provide interpretation.134 In such a context, it is
traditionally said that there is no precedent in civil law. It is true that in civil
law, there is no absolute precedent in the common law sense. It would be
unthinkable and inconsistent in a civil law system for precedents to be used to
undermine the code law. Instead, legal precedents are often deemed reasonable
because the courts have arrived at the correct interpretation of a particular
aspect of code law. Other courts should be expected to follow such precedent
not because the precedent is case law, but rather because the precedent declares
the correct interpretation of code law. Hence, precedents cannot exist without a
interpretation of an ordinary statute; they use precedents established by common law; they make reference to
foreign common-law interpretations of civil law (for example, provisions of Quebec Civil Code based on
English statutes); and they rely on the importation of common law doctrines in the application of civil law (for
example, in property law). Id.
128 See Algero, supra note 100, at 781.
129 See MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 98, at 78.
130 See generally id. at 93-102 (providing arguments for and against stare decisis, after having surveyed
stare decisis in English, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand appellate courts).
131 See id. at 93, 97.
132 See id. at 98 99.
"' See id. at 100.
134 See William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodi~fed), 60
LA. L. REV. 677, 684, 704-05 (2000).
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clear code source. Furthermore, they are declaratory in the sense that they do
not create law, but clarify the correct interpretation of the law.135
It is in this framework that we can understand the active development of
the general principles of law by many civil law courts. Codes are abstract:
They must be interpreted in specific circumstances.136 For example, tort law
has been systematically developed in France by case law, given the historical
absence of specific codification French civil law.137 In Germany, important
legal developments such as culpa in contrahendo were pursued by courts
before codification in 2002. The development of tort law by French and
German courts has to be framed in light of declaratory precedents.
The French doctrine of precedent is known as jurisprudence constante.139
Strictly speaking, precedent is not and cannot be a source of law.140 Article 5
of the French Civil Code prohibits judge-made law (arret de r'glement).141
Courts are denied the power of making law.142 Therefore, judges are never, and
cannot be, bound by precedent.143 Exclusive reference to precedent is, in fact,
illegal.144 However, legislation commands lower courts to follow "decisions of
all the chambers of the Court of Cassation sitting together, or of the plenary
Civil Law Chamber, when a case is remanded for determination according to
instructions."1 45
135 See James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial
Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993).
136 See Claire M. Germain, Approaches to Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History in France, 13
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'LL. 195, 195 96 (2003).
17 See Edwin M. Borchard, French Administrative Law, 18 IOWA L. REv. 133, 139 (1933).138 Rodrigo Novoa, Culpa in Contrahendo: A Comparative Law Study: Chilean Law and the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 22 ARIZONA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
583, 585 (2005); Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Contracts, in INTRODUCTION TO GERVIAN LAW 179, 195-96
(Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2005).
139 See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis, 26
INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 519, 522 23 (2006).
140 See id. at 522.
141 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 5 (Fr.); accord A.N. Yiannopoulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine as Sources of
Law in Louisiana and in France, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN
MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 18, at 67, 73.
142 See Mitchel de S.-O.-'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal
System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1335 (1995).
143 See id. at 1336-38.
144 CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 455 (Fr.); accord Michael Troper & Christophe
Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS A COIPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 17, at
106-07,115.
145 Yiannapoulos, supra note 141, at 73 (citing "Laws of April 1, 1837" and "July 23, 1947").
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Jurisprudence constante is established by: (i) a sequence of cases that have
been appealed to the Cour de Cassation; (ii) repetition of reasoning and
interpretation (exceptionally it can be established by one decisive case at the
Cour de Cassation); and (iii) the question to be clarified by precedent is merely
related to a point of law (pourvoi en cassation).146 Therefore, precedent under
French law has four main attributes. It must reflect a continuous and permanent
practice of the courts.147 There is no obligation to follow it, although decisions
will be reversed by higher courts if violated.148 It focuses on jurisprudential
activity of the Cour de Cassation (arrdt de principe).149 Finally, there is no
horizontal effect, implying that if conflicts occur, there is no formal solution.150
According to legal scholars, precedent is de facto law in France due to
important practical reasons, namely that: (i) there is a need for continuity and
stability of law, independent of individual judges coming and going; (ii) it
provides for a significant economy of effort in establishing authoritative legal
interpretation; (iii) the collegial organization of higher courts is likely to
promote accuracy on applying the law; and (iv) it reinforces the needed
judicial hierarchy for a functional legal system. 151 Still, the formal discourse in
French law is that judicially created norms are not law even when they
function as such.152
The Italian dottrina giuridica and Spanish doctrina juridica are not
significantly different from the French jurisprudence constante. In Italy,
judicial precedent focuses on general principles of law (massima). Judicial
precedent does not have to be followed.15 4 Nevertheless, Italian lower courts
regularly cite and apply general principles as interpreted by the highest court,
especially on important legal issues. 1 Precedents have an interpretative value
towards establishing "decision-rules" that assure uniformity in the law.156
146 See Jean Carbonnier, supra note 18, at 92-94.
147 f.d.
148 Cf id.
149 Cf id.
150 Cf id.
1 See Yiannopoulos, supra note 141, at 75-76.
152 See Lasser, supra note 142, at 1346-50.
1 Taruffo & La Torre, supra note 18, at 148.
154 Cf id. at 151-52, 154-55.
155 See id. at 156; Francesco G. Mazzotta, Precedent in Italian Law, 9 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 121, 140-43
(2000).
156 John Henry Merryman, The Italian Legal Style II: Interpretation, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 18, at 163, 195-96.
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However, they cannot be applied to the exclusion of code law since courts are
expected to decide every case with reference to code law.157 The decisions of
the Constitutional Court and the Council of State have erga omnes effects and,
in that sense, they constitute binding precedents. In Spain, the Constitutional
Court has clarified that judges are bound by statutory law and not by
precedent.159 However, for example, although courts cannot refuse to pass
judgment, they can dismiss an appeal if a precedent exists that provides legal
support.160 At the same time, the rulings of the Spanish Supreme Court provide
guidance to lower courts.161 The Spanish civil code recognizes that case law
can be used in interpretation of statutes and general principles of law. In
Portugal, the Constitutional Court has established that decisions by the
Supreme Court are not binding; however, lower courts can use them to clarify
statutory law. 162
The German standige Rechtsprechung is developed in the same context.
Precedent is valid in the sense of sociologically influencing courts, but not in
the normative sense.163 Constitutional Court decisions have the force of statute
(Gesetzeskraft).164 All others are not formally binding. However they are de
facto valid (faktische Geltung).165 Lower courts usually look at the Federal
Court of Appeals and state courts of appeals for guidance.166 As with the
French doctrine, precedent must be established by permanent and continuous
interpretation (stcindige Rechtsprechung). 16 It focuses on leading rules
(Leitentscheidungen). 1 There is no general rule of horizontal formal binding
effect (except for decisions by the Constitutional Court).169 The argument by
157 See Tarufto & La Torre, supra note 18, at 158.
158 Merryman, supra note 156, at 193.
159 Alfonso Ruiz Miguel & Francisco J. Laporta, Precedent in Spain, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 17, at 259, 269 (discussing S.T.C. Mar. 28, 1985 (B.O.E. No. 49) (Spain)).
160 Id. at 263.
161 See Carlos G6mez-Jara & Luis E. Chiesa, Spain, in HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 119, at 488, 493.
162 Tribunal Constitucional [TC] [Constitutional Court], December 7, 1993, TC 810/93 (Port.), available
at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/19930810 .htm.
16, See generally Alexy & Dreier, supra note 18.
164 Id. at 26.
165 Id. at 28.
166 See Thomas Weigend, Germany, in HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 119, at
252, 256.
167 Alexy & Dreier, supra note 18, at 50.
168 Id. at 40, 51.
169 Id. at 34, 39.
578 [Vol. 26
STARE DECISTS AND CERTIORARI ARRIVE TO BRAZIL
German legal scholars is that extracting a leading theory from a particular
answer to a controversial question could be problematic. 170 Therefore the court
needs to be allowed to frequently deviate from its own theory by introducing or
qualifying distinctions and therefore actually developing law.171
The Asian civil law jurisdictions-including Japan, which has been
influenced by the constitutional design of the United States-follow the
German approach closely. 2 There is no formal mechanism of precedent used
by Japanese courts but, in practice, the Supreme Court's decisions are given
significant weight and the lower courts rarely render rulings that are
inconsistent with existing Supreme Court decisions. Furthermore, the
existing statutory law does not clarify the role of case law, although the
prevailing legal doctrine is that precedents set by the Supreme Court are
merely persuasive, and not law. 174 Furthermore, decisions by the highest
prewar court (Taishin'in) are also accorded deference, although not formal
precedent. Violations of precedent are a reason for appeal.176 Supreme Court
precedents can only be modified by decisions en banc.'17
A similar pattern is followed by Taiwan. However, each year, the
Taiwanese Supreme Court's Precedent Editing Committee selects important
precedents from the Court's decisions. The selected decisions are then edited
170 See id at 53-54 (describing the conflicting "zigzag" lines of precedent that are rare, but do exist, in
German law).
171 id.
172 See generally Tsung-Fu Chen, Transplant of Civil Code in Japan, Taiwan, and China: with the Focus
of Legal Evolution, 6 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 389 (2011); Lynn Parisi, Lessons on the Japanese
Constitution, JAPAN DIGEST (November 2002), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/131/const.pdf
173 See Hiroshi Itoh, The Role of Precedent at Japan's Supreme Court, 88 WASH U. L. REV. 1631, 1632,
1640 (2011).
174 See generally Saibanshoho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947 (Japan), translation available at http:/
www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=02&dn=1&x=100&y-32&bu=4&ky-&page=19;
Shinegori Matsui, Constitutional Precedents in Japan: A Comment on the Role of Precedent, 88 WASH U. L.
REV. 1669 (2011).
175 John 0. Haley, Japan, in HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 119, at 393, 396.
176 KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, art. 405 (Japan), translation available at http://www.
japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=02&dn=1&x=80&y=24&bu=16&ky=&page=5.
177 Court Act, supra note 174, art. 10, para. 3.
78 Structure and Functions of the Subordinate Organs of the Judicial Yuan, JUDICIAL YuAN, http://www.
judicial. gov.tw/en/english/aboutus/aboutus04/aboutus04-04.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) ("If the Supreme
Administrative Court makes an interpretation of the law in its judgment or ruling and it is determined that
there is a need to have the interpretation compiled into a precedent, the Supreme Administrative Court will
hold a joint conference attended by the President, Division Chief Judges and Associate Judges, and will, by
resolution of the conference, report said precedent to the Judicial Yuan.").
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by the Committee. 179 By the time a precedent report is published, there will be
no facts left in the decisions, but only interpretations of abstract legal
concepts.180 Although there are legal bases for this method, some justices of
the Judicial Yuan have criticized the constitutionality of the method." Lower
courts statutorily do not have the obligation to follow precedents. 82
Nevertheless in practice, decisions by lower courts which are contradictory to
the interpretations provided by precedent reports will normally be withdrawn
or dismissed. 183 Therefore, the majority of lower courts follow the
interpretations of the precedent reports.
In South Korea, court decisions do not have general binding effect over the
lower courts. Judges in South Korea are not entitled to make case law by their
decisions under a constitutional principle of power separation which implies
that judges are not obliged to follow prior decisions by the superior courts. 184
However, higher court decisions have strong influence upon the lower court
judges and administrative entities. Decisions by the Constitutional Court of
Korea, however, have legally binding force, which is a unique power that
distinguishes the Constitutional Court from other ordinary courts. 85
As a matter of systematization, legal scholars see two main differences
regarding the role and conceptualization of precedent in common and in civil
law jurisdictions, namely intensity and approach. 1 First, we must consider the
degree of persuasion higher courts have upon lower courts. In civil law courts,
lower courts only follow precedent if it is jurisprudence constante, if it does
not contradict legislation, and if it is consistent with the context of their legal
system. The civil law lower courts feel that the precedent is strong if it
179 Id.
180 See Interpretations, JUDICIAL YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp (last
visited Sept. 28, 2012), for examples of Taiwanese judicial interpretations.
181 E-mail Interview with Professor Wen-Chen Chang, National Taiwan University (Dec. 29, 2010).
182 See CHANG-FA Lo, THE LEGAL CULTURE AND SYSTEM OF TAIwAN 42-43 (2006).
183 Id.
184 The Constitution grants judges a power to independently decide according to their conscience
conforming to the Constitution and statute laws. DAEHANMiNKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art.
103 (S. Kor), The Court Organization Act stipulates that a court decision by a superior court only binds the
lower court of the same case from which the appeal was raised. Court Organization Act, Act. No. 3902, Dec.
4, 1897, art. 8, amended by Act. No. 8794, Dec. 27, 2007 (S. Kor.), translation available at http://eng.scourt.
go.kr/eboard/NewsViewAction.work?gubun-42&seqnum=1.
185 Constitutional Court Act, Aug. 5, 1988, arts. 47, 75 (S. Kor.).
186 See Baudouin, supra note 127, at 13.
187 Id
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satisfies these conditions, but not that it is binding per se. For example,
while one single decision by the higher courts could establish a precedent in
common law, it cannot in civil law (with some minor exceptions). 189 Second,
the civil law judge looks first at legislation and only uses precedent to
supplement it, whereas the common law judge will look at precedent as a
primary source of law.190
As to the admission of an appeal by the highest courts, there is no formal
civil law writ of certiorari. However, most jurisdictions rely on procedural
rules that can be used to exercise some control and limit access. For example,
in German law, access is subject to fundamental importance in principle
(grundsitzliche Bedeutung), with some variation in constitutional law
appeals. 191 At the same time, a recent reform of the German Code of Civil
Procedure has limited appeals in civil cases to disputes exceeding a certain
amount, aimed at cleaning backlogs.192 Italy and Spain accept appeals to their
constitutional courts but condition admission on the merits of a case.193
Evidently, a heavier workload tends to be correlated with a stricter
interpretation of merit or fundamental importance, while a lighter workload
corresponds to a broader assessment of merit.
Another example is Japan where a discretionary appeal system is adopted.
Based on the reasons for appeal, civil cases are divided into two categories:
those that automatically have the right to appeal and those that must obtain the
Supreme Court's permission in order to appeal.194 Similarly in criminal
actions, a distinction is made between cases that are automatically appealable
188 Id
189 d.
190 Id. at 15.
191 VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG [VwGO] [CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE], March 19,
1991, § 124 (Ger.).
192 In 2001, a reform of the Code of Civil Procedure limited appeals in civil cases to disputes exceeding
20,000 Euros, effective until December 2011. Einfuthrung der ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPOEG] [Act to Introduce
Code of Civil Procedure], Jan. 30, 1877, last amended by Gesetz [G] July 27, 2001, 26, para. 8 (Ger.).
193 See Organic Law on the Constitution art. 43 (1979, 2) (Spain), translation available at http:/www.
tribunalconstitucional.es/en/tribunal/normasreguladoras/Lists/NormasRegPDF/LOTC-en.pdf; The Italian
Constitutional Court, CORTE COSTITUZIONALE, http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ActionPagina 324.do (last
visited Sept. 29, 2012) (listing in section 5.7 the reasons why the court would deny hearing of an appeal).
194 See MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, arts. 312, 318 (Japan), translation available at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.gojp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=02&dn= &yo=Code+of+Civil+Procedure&x=0
&y=0&ky=&page=1.
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and those that are subject to the Supreme Court's discretion.195 The Supreme
Court decides whether or not to hear an appeal in all discretionary cases, such
as those seeking unification of the interpretations of law, those without
precedents interpreting the law, and those causing changes in the
interpretations which have already been established by precedents.196 Like the
certiorari system in the United States, this mechanism is designed to give the
Japanese Supreme Court the power to adjust its own caseload, and therefore to
prevent the flooding of cases into the Court. Nevertheless, the system has not
been very successful in deterring congestion.197
South Korea has faced the same challenge. In the past, all appeals to the
Supreme Court would have required permission to be reviewed at the Supreme
Court. 198 This system, criticized for invading the constitutional right to trial,
was abolished in 1990.199 However, to reduce the burden on the Supreme
Court from unreasonable or unnecessary appeals, in 1994 the congress adopted
a new system which limits appeals to the Supreme Court. 200 The new system
allows the Supreme Court to dismiss an appeal without trial when the cause of
appeal does not include significant violation of law (Constitution, acts,
regulations, and orders), and, even though violation of law is a cause for
appeal, when the cause itself is unreasonable, when it is irrelevant to the
original verdict, or when it does not have any influence on the original
verdict.201 Furthermore, under this system, the Supreme Court is allowed to not
provide reasons in the decision when the appeal is dismissed for the grounds
above.202 The Constitutional Court of Korea concluded in 1997 that this new
system is constitutional because the right to trial under the Constitution does
203
not require the Supreme Court to hear and review every appeal2. The Court
195 See KEIJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, arts. 405-06 (Japan), translation available at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.gojp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=02&dn=1&x=80&y=24&bu=16&ky=&page=5.
If the reason for appeal is listed in Article 405 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the appellant only needs to file
a petition for appeal, whereas if the reason for appeal is not listed in Article 405, the appellate must file a
petition for acceptance of appeal under Article 406. Id. Article 405 only allows the appeal of decisions which
are violations of the Constitution or contradictory to higher courts' precedents. Id., art. 405.
196 MINSOHO, art. 318; KEISOHO, art. 406.
197 See, e.g., David Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Reviewl in Japan, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 1545, 1577 (2009).
98 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 1997Hun-Ba37 501, 513-14, Oct. 30, 1997 (S. Kor.).
199 Jd
200 Jd
201 id
202 Jd
203 id
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further explained that one of the important roles of the appeals system is to
reasonably distribute limited legal resources and this decision belongs to
legislature.204 At the same time, this system meets the purpose by respecting
the dignity of the Supreme Court as the highest court and by providing an
objective and consistent standard over legal interpretation.205 Furthermore, the
Trial of Small Claims Act limits appeals to the Supreme Court of claims
smaller than a certain amount.206 The Constitutional Court of Korea
unanimously concluded in 2009 that the act does not unconstitutionally invade
the petitioners' right to trial. 207 The Court said that, in the absence of special
circumstances, it is within the legislature's discretion whether to allow all
claims to appeal to the Supreme Court.208 Also, the Court explained that the
limited legal resources of the Supreme Court should be invested for more
serious and complicated cases. Therefore, the act's aim to resolve small claims
efficiently is legitimate and it does not unreasonably or unconstitutionally treat
petitioners.209 However, despite these devices to limit appeals to the Supreme
Court, huge amounts of appeals are presented and reviewed by the Korean
- 210justices.
B. The Context in Latin America
The problems encountered by the Brazilian Supreme Court are not unique
in Latin American. The absence of formal stare decisis and a mechanism of
certiorari induced creative approaches in the region much the same way they
did in Brazil. To some extent, stimula vinculante and requisito da repercussao
geral are Brazilian legal inventions, but they can be understood better in the
context of other similar developments in Latin America.
204 id
205 id
206 Soaek sakeon simpan beob [Trial of Small Claims Act], Act No. 2547, Feb. 24, 1973, amended by,
inter alia, Act No. 7427, March 31, 2011, art. 3 (S. Kor.). The amount of the claim must be less than
20,000,000 Won (approximately USD $18,000). Soaek sakeon simpan kyuchick [Small Claims Judgment
Decree], Constitutional Court Decree No. 1779, July 1, 2002, as amended (S. Kor), available at http://www.
law. go. krjoStmdlnfoP.do?lsiSeq=67520&joNo=0002&joBrNo=00 (click on "chomun" [content provision]
button).
207 Constitutional Court (Const. Ct.), 2007Hun-Mal433 505, 505, Feb. 28, 2009 (S. Kor.).
208 id.
209 id
210 See Statistics: Litigation, SUPREME COURT OF KOREA, http://eng.scourt.go.kr/eng/resources/statistics
litigation civil jsp (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (noting that the number of intermediate appeals of civil cases to
the Supreme Court have increased from 33,511 in 2003 to 51,929 in 2011, and that the number of final appeals
of civil cases to the Supreme Court have increased from 7,143 in 2003 to 11,500 in 2011).
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The doctrine of obligatoriedad atenuada (which translates to "attenuated
obligation"), or presunci6n juris tantum de obligatoriedad (which translates to
"presumption juris tantum of obligation"), was developed in Argentina.2 11
Formally speaking, there is no vertical mechanism of precedent.212 However,
through an evolving process of interpretation, the Supreme Court of Argentina
has created a doctrine of effective vertical precedent. Beginning in 1948, the
Court asserted its authority as authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, and
announced that departures from its interpretation without contesting its
foundations amount to contempt of that authority. 213 Later, the Court stated
that for a deviation or departure to be valid, a lower court must provide new
214legal arguments that justify such action. In 1985, the Supreme Court
eventually consolidated its current doctrine and held that although the Court's
judgments are not strictly legally binding in analogous cases, inferior courts
have the duty to abide by these judgments, unless the departure is justified by a
new legal argument.215 As a result, although the Argentinean approach differs
from the strict binding obligation established by the doctrine of stare decisis,
the Supreme Court was more successful in imposing its vertical hierarchical
power absent for so long in Brazil. More recently, the Court expressed that
compliance with binding precedent assures equality before the law, which
mandates that analogous cases are given an equal solution, even if there is no
formal law establishing such binding precedent.216
A similar pattern can be found in Colombia. While the Constitutional Court
creates precedent through its authoritative and binding constitutional
interpretation erga omnes, the Supreme Court faces the standard problem of an
211 Santiago Legarre, Precedent in Argentine Law, 57 Loy. L. REV. 781, 785 n. 19 (2011 ); Fallo de Hoy.
Se declara la nulidad de las resoluciones por una deuda en concepto de Contribuci6n que incide sobre la
Actividad Comercial, Industrial y de Servicios de la Aunicipalidad de la Ciudad de Cardoba, THOMSON
REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://thomsonreuterslatam.com/jurisprudencia/15/02/2012/fallo.
212 See Santiago Legarre & Julio Cesar Rivera, La Obligatoriedad Atenuada de los Fallos de la Corte
Suprena y el Stare Decisis Vertical, 2009-E LA LEY 820 (2009).
213 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 6/10/1948,
"Santin, Jacinto c. Impuestos Internos," Fallos (1948-212-59) (Arg.).
214 See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 17/11/1981,
"Cesar Anibal Balbuena," Fallos (1981-303-1770) (Arg.).
215 See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 4/7/1985,
"Ceramica San Lorenzo," Fallos (1985-307-1094) (Arg.).
216 Congreso de la Naci6n-Camara de Diputados [House of Representatives], 13/7/2007, "Domingo
Antonio Bussi," (2007) (Arg.).
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217
absence of a formal stare decisis doctrine2. The Supreme Court uses the
doctrina probable (which translates to "probable doctrine") as a flexible
method to unify its jurisprudence and therefore create some effective
218precedent. In 1887, it was legislated that in doubtful cases, the judges will
apply the most probable doctrine. 219 Three uniform decisions of the Supreme
Court, as a cassation tribunal, on the same point of law, constitute the doctrina
probable.220 This statement was further developed by new laws in 1889, 1890
and 1896.221 Recently, the Constitutional Court has confirmed the doctrina
probable and reiterated the binding nature of the precedents of the Supreme
Court established under such doctrine.222 It also held that judges of lower
courts, when departing from the doctrina probable established by the Supreme
Court, must clearly and reasonably explain the legal basis to justify their
departure from the doctrina probable.223
Similarly, in Chile, only the Constitutional Court creates formal precedents
given the authoritative and binding erga omnes constitutional interpretation.224
The Supreme Court engages in concrete constitutional review (while the
Constitutional Court exercises abstract review), but the decisions are only
217 See generally Carlos Bernal Pulido, El Precedente en Colombia, 83 REVISTA DE DERECHO DEL
ESTADO 87 (2008) (Colom.).
218 See, e.g., Martha 1. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court; the Gender Jurisprudence of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 253, 280 n.106 (1999).
219 L. 153/87, agosto 15, 1887, DIARIo OFICIAL [DO.] art. 10 (Colom.).
220 Jd
221 Legislation in 1889 set forth that three uniform decisions of the Supreme Court, as a cassation tribunal,
on the same point of law, constitute the doctrina probable that judges could apply to analogous cases, which
would not prevent the court from varying the doctrine if it determined that previous decisions were erroneous.
L. 169/89, julio 3, 1889, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 4 (Colom.). Here, judges could decide whether or not to
apply the doctrina probable. Id. The case number requirement was later modified in 1890, whereby two
uniform decisions of the Supreme Court would now constitute the doctrina probable. L. 105/90, diciembre 2
1890, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 371 (Colom.). L. 105/90 went on to state that if there is no law applicable to
an issue before the court, two uniform Supreme Court pronouncements pertaining to that issue may fill the
legal gap Id. Legislation in 1896, however, endorsed the initial approach taken by L. 169/89, codifying what is
considered today as the doctrina probable. L. 169/96, diciembre 31, 1896, DIARIO OFICIAL [DO.] art. 4
(Colom.).
222 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 9, 2001, Sentencia C-836/01, Gaceta de la
Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2001/c-
836-01.htm.
223 ld
224 Edith Z. Friedler, Judicial Review in Chile, 7 Sw. JL. & TRADE AMs. 321, 343-44 (2000).
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binding inter partes.225 This division of labor in constitutional review has
raised serious concerns and diluted the strength of precedent in Chilean law.226
In Venezuela, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has the
power to issue a binding precedent erga omnes in the context of abstract and
concrete (amparo) constitutional review.227 Lately, the Chamber extended such
power to judicial decisions by other courts when in contradiction with the
Constitution. 228  Such significant power is not shared by the Cassation
Chambers of the Supreme Court.229
In Mexico, decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court are regularly cited by
lower courts.230 Consistent rulings that have precedential weight are known as
jurisprudencia obligatoria. There are also Mexican Supreme Court
decisions that do not have full precedential value, named tesis aisladas, but
they have persuasive authority. The precedent established byjurisprudencia
is accepted once there are five consecutive and consistent decisions on a point
of law by the Supreme Federal Court or federal collegiate courts.233 Before
1951, following the civil law tradition, jurisprudencia had no constitutional
234 . 235basis. However, several constitutional amendments changed the situation.
The legal implications are that only federal courts can issue binding decisions
225 id
226 See generally Friedler, supra note 224 (surveying the Chilean Supreme Court's review of the Chilean
Constitution).
227 Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Venezuela, 45 DUO. L. REV. 439, 442-43, 447 (2007).
228 Id. at 445.
229 id
230 See Woodfin L. Butte, Stare Decisis, Doctrine and Jurisprudence in Mexico and Elsewhere, in TIE
ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 18, at
311,328.
231 See, e.g., M.C. Mirow, Marbury in Mexico: Judicial Review's Precocious Southern Migration, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 41, 57 n.99 (2007).
232 STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 85 (2004). See id for more information regarding the
Mexican legal system.
233 Jose Maria Serna de la Garza, The Concept of Jurisprudencia in Mexican Law, 10 MEx. L. REV.
(2009) (Mex.).
234 id
235 Article 107-XIII of the Mexican Constitution was amended in 1951 to establish that "statute law shall
determine the terms and cases in which the jurisprudencia from Federal Judicial Branch Courts is binding, as
well as the requirements for its modification." Id. In 1967, this rule was subsequently transferred to Article 94
of the Constitution with an amendment meant to clarify the kind of norms that could be the object of
jurisprudencia: "Statute law shall determine the terms in which the jurisprudencia from Federal Judicial
Branch Courts on the interpretation of the Constitution, federal and local statutes and rulings, and international
treaties entered into by the Mexican State is binding, as well as the requirements for its interruption and
modification." Id
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and that these binding decisions refer to the interpretation of the Constitution,
federal and state statutes, and rulings and international treaties.236 Finally,
"[s]tatute laws passed by the Federal Congress are the instruments that define
the terms under which binding legal decisions can be produced." 237 The three
legal implications listed above "are part of the current constitutional system of
binding legal decisions in Mexican law."238
Supreme Courts in Latin America have developed legal doctrines to decline
appeals in the absence of formal certiorari. The Supreme Court of Argentina
declines extraordinary appeals if the cases lack sufficient federal grievance or
the issues raised prove to be unsubstantial or devoid of significance.239 The
decision to invoke this refusal must be supported by the majority of justices.240
However, such doctrine is not immune to criticism even after its
constitutionality has been explicitly recognized by the Court.241 This doctrine
has been a method used by the Court to control the large number of appeals
that are filed every year.242 Comparing the Argentinean form of certiorari to
U.S. certiorari, while both procedural mechanisms are grounded on the sound
discretion of the Court, the American version is a mechanism that grants access
236 id
237 id.
238 [ci
239 CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACION [COD. PROC. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 280 (Arg.).
240 CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACION [COD. PROC. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 281 (Arg.).
241 Critics emphasize the conflict that exists between the doctrina de la arbitrariedad (which translates to
"doctrine of arbitrariness") and the doctrina de gravedad institucional (which translates to "doctrine of
institutional gravity"), and the Supreme Court's denial mechanism. See generally Claudia Beatriz Sbdar,
Presente y futuro del recurso extraordinario federal: El rol de Ia Corte Suprena de la Nacion, REVISTA
IBERAMERICANA DE DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL 217 (July-December 2008). Through the doctrina
de gravedad institucional, the Court made up for the lack of any admissibility requirement in an extraordinary
case. Id. at 230. The premise of the argument is that extraordinary appeal deals with the Constitution, hence it
is of extreme institutional gravity. Id. Likewise, under the doctrina de la arbitrariedad, the Court reviews
sentences of lower courts that might lack sufficient legal basis. Id. at 229. Critics of the denial mechanism
suggest that the Court now declines cases without having to base its decision on sufficient legal grounds, and
therefore violates the doctrines previously recognized. Id. at 235. The Supreme Court has recently recognized
the constitutional validity of the denial mechanism (through Articles 280 and 285 of the Civil and Commercial
Procedure Code) because it allows the Court to perform more efFectively its mission of safeguarding the
Constitution by exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction more successfully in cases of transcendental
importance. Id.
242 Id. at 235.
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to the Court, while the Argentinean version is a mechanism used to deny
access to the Court.243
A Colombian certiorari has also recently been developed. Until 1996,
appeals could only be rejected by the Supreme Court if they failed with some
procedural rules.244 There was no procedural discretionary mechanism that
allowed the Court to refuse admission of appeals once the cases met all the
formal requirements. After 1996, discretion in selecting cases has been
progressively granted with the aim of reducing congestion and delays.245 A
similar approach has been largely taken by the Constitutional Court.246
Mexico, Chile and Venezuela have developed their own procedural rules to
regulate admissibility of appeals to the Supreme Court (or in the case of Chile,
to the Constitutional Court). For example, in Mexico, appeals to the Supreme
Court have to be of general interest and relevant (criterio de importancia y
transcendencia).247 These rules of extraordinary appeal are usually less
generous than for other appeals, but they have largely failed in affording these
courts greater control of their dockets. 248
243 See Alberto B. Bianchi & Santiago Legarre, El "Certiorari" en Accidn (Hacia un Control de
Constitucionalidad Basado en la Trascendencia), 1993-C LA LEY 841 (1993); Alberto J. Egtes, El Certiorari
Argentino, 1993-C LA LEY 661 (1993); Maria A. Gelli, El "Writ of Certiorari" en Perspectiva, 1994-B LA
LEY 880 (1994); Jorge A. Rojas, Las Auevas Fronteras del Recurso Extraordinario Federal, 2008-E LA LEY
858 (2008).
244 Cf infra note 245.
245 L. 270/96, marzo 7, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [DO.] art. 16 (Colom.), http://www.secretariasenado.gov.
co/senado/basedoc/ley/1996/ley_0270_1996.htmi (last visited Sept. 24, 2012). In 2009, the law was amended,
stating that the cassation chambers of the Supreme Court may select the decisions that are going to be subject
to a judgment, for the purpose of unifying the jurisprudence, protecting constitutional rights, and controlling
legal decisions. Id. (incorporating L. 1285/09, enero 22, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.)). As a result,
this addition provides the three specialized chambers of the Court (civil, criminal, and labor) with the option of
selecting the sentences upon which they decide to cast judgment, thus, rejecting the admission of sentences not
selected for review. Id In 2008, the constitutionality of these provisions was confirmed by the Colombian
Constitutional Court. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 15, 2008, Sentencia C-713/08,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
relatoria/2008/c-713-08.htm.
246 See generally Juan Carlos Guayacan, La Seleccian de Sentencias Para la Unificacian de la
Jurisprudencia, 19 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 57 (2010), available at http://foros.uextemado.edu.co/
ecoinstitucional/index.php/derpri/article/view/2489/2127.
247 La Reforma Constitucional en Materia de Amparo, PODER JUDICIAL DE LA FEDERACION, 1, 10, http:/
www.cjf gob. mx/reformas/documentos/tripticoReformaAmparo.pdf
248 See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 232, at 192; Brewer-Carias, supra note 227, at 464-65; Friedler, supra
note 224, at 346-47.
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111. LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRECEDENT AND CERTIORARI
A. The Economics ofPrecedent
Legal economists have provided for a rational theory of precedent. An
earlier literature assessed the extent to which precedent improves the overall
efficiency of the legal system. This approach is known as the "efficiency
theory of the common law", and is associated with Judge Richard Posner, who
argues that the doctrines in common law provide a coherent and consistent
system of incentives which induce efficient behavior.249 In this context,
precedent is instrumental in guaranteeing and achieving efficiency.250 The
efficiency of the common law generated discussion among legal economists
quite early in the law and economics literature. According to some, efficiency
is promoted by the prevalence of precedent (more efficient rules are more
likely to survive through a mechanism of precedent). 251 However, this
argument has faced serious challenges. For example, even if judges are
ultimately efficiency-seeking, precedent and overruling must be balanced in an
appropriate way. A judicial bias might distort the law in the short run but at the
same time provide a mechanism to improve the law in the long run, depending
on critical elements of the evolution of the common law. 252
Precedents therefore constitute a fundamental aspect in explaining the
evolution of a legal system. They have a public good nature which is likely to
imply that they are not produced in the most efficient manner (since courts do
not internalize future gains derived from a particular precedent much the same
way judges do not internalize external gains from producing judicial
opinions). 253 Presumably, it is true that bad rules are challenged more often
than good rules, so naturally court intervention through a mechanism of
precedent could improve the overall quality of the law. However, this line of
249 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 33, 743-54 (8th ed. 2011).
250 Id. at 754 (stating that a judge's most efficient method for deciding cases and resolving issues is to
follow precedent closely, and to let the legislature adapt the law to change).
251 See generally John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978) George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977);
Peter R. Terrebone, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STuD. 397 (1981).
252 See generally Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the Instability of Law, 35 J. COMP.
ECON. 309 (2007); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleiter, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43
(2007).
253 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235,
248 (1979).
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reasoning is not without problematic shortcomings.254 In certain contexts,
precedent could bias legal rules against efficiency.255 Precedent certainly
generates path dependence that could undermine the process of evolutionary
256
efficiency. Strong precedent could be socially valuable if lower court judges
are significantly biased. 257
Not surprisingly, legal economists have turned their attention to the
establishment and evolution of precedent. 258 However, there are significant
economic advantages and disadvantages to adhering to the principle of
absolute precedent that has been recognized by legal economists.
The advantages of absolute precedent listed by economic literature are the
following:
(i) It provides for a substantial reduction of legal uncertainty since the
outcomes are predictable, hence reinforcing the stability of the law.259 Legal
certainty is important for business transactions and social interactions since it
reduces transaction costs.260 By making law enforcement easier to predict and
254 See Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gomez Liguerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law, 29
B.U. INT'L L.J. 288, 296-98 (2011) Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gomez Ligterre, The Evolution of the Common
Law and Efficiency, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-
1805141.
255 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution ofLegal Rules, 80 GEo. L.J. 583 (1992).
256 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 659 (2001).
257 See Thomas J. Miceli, Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent, 38 J. LEGAL
STUD. 157, 164-65 (2009) Luca Anderlini et al., Why Stare Decisis? (Centre for Economic Policy Research,
Discussion paper 8266, February 2011), available at http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/Ifelli/papers/Stare%/o20
Decisis.pdf.
258 See generally Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, A Theory ofRational Jurisprudence, 120 J. POL. ECON.
513 (2012); Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Komhauser, Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selection, and the
Structure ofJudicial Hierarchies, in INSTITUTIONAL GAws AND THE U.S. SuPREME COURT 173 (Jon Bond et
al. eds., 2006); Ben Depoorter et al., Litigation, Judicial Path-dependence, and Legal Change. 20 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. 43 (2005); Patricio A. Fernandez & Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto, Stare Decisis: Rhetoric and Substance, 28
JL. ECON. & ORG. 313 (2012) Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal
Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the
Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986); Lewis A. Kornhauser,
An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHIl-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989); Kornhauser, supra note 15, 509
13; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 JL.
& ECON. 249 (1976); Georg von Wagenheim, The Evolution ofJudge-Made Laiw, 13 INT'L REV. L. & EcON
381 (1993).
259 Depoorter et al., supra note 258, at 44, note 3.
260 Heiner, supra note 258, at 229, 255 (arguing that people will benefit from following simple rules in
decision-making, despite errors that may occur when such rules are applied on a case-by-case basis).
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understand, it enhances legal compliance since it reduces the incidence of
behavioral mistakes.261
(ii) It promotes equality under the law since absolute precedent "[t]reat[s]
like cases alike" (legal fairness).262 The outcome of a particular litigation no
longer depends on the individual judge or on a particular court.263 It reduces
risk exposure and asymmetric treatment of identical business transactions or
-264
social interactions.
(iii) It favors competent adjudication for different reasons. First, an
absolute precedent enhances cognitive effectiveness for lower court judges.265
Second, it reduces error when judges are not experts in a particular area of the
266law. Third, due to the fact that accurate decisions are less likely to be made
in isolation, judicial quality is enhanced.267
(iv) It induces a substantial reduction of workload for the court system (by
helping the formation of convergent expectations across parties) and time
consumed in adjudication (decisional effectiveness).268 Therefore, it reduces
frivolous lawsuits and favors higher settlement rates.269
At the same time, economic literature has focused on noteworthy
disadvantages of absolute precedent, namely:
(i) Absolute precedent can be the source of systematic judicial error, in
particular when changes in values and in context are significant.270
Improvements in legal technology are frequently disregarded in a system with
absolute precedent, therefore precluding the courts from benefiting from new
advances.271 When courts have imperfect decision-making due to complex
261 Cf Kornhauser, supra note 258, at 77-78.
262 Id. at 74.
263 See generally Baker & Mezzetti, snpra note 258.
264 [ci
265 Cf Kornhauser, supra note 258, at 76-77.
266 Cf id.
267 Cf id.
268 Id. at 77.
269 See Yeon-Koo Che & Jong Goo Yi, The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation, 9 J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 399, 417 (1993).
270 See Kornhauser, supra note 258, 69 71.
271 Cf id. at 71-72 (discussing lags in incorporating available information).
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fact-finding and specificity, they are subject to less external monitoring if
272
precedents cannot be challenged.
(ii) It reduces flexibility to correct wrong decisions or internalize specific
-273biases.
(iii) It promotes and helps the ossification of case law, hence reducing the
possibility of legal developments and enlarging the gap between law and
society.274
(iv) It induces serious costs borne by lower court judges when trying to
justify departure from precedent.275 These costs are more significant when the
rationale behind the precedent (ratio decidendi) is unclear or less
transparent. 276
An economic analysis that recognizes important benefits and costs
associated with absolute precedent indicates that a more flexible approach is
closer to an optimal institutional design. In fact, if we ponder the advantages
and disadvantages identified by legal economists, it is likely that the current
legal understanding of stare decisis is more efficient than the notion of absolute
precedent.
With respect to civil law jurisdictions, there has been very little
comprehensive economic analysis of precedent.277 An immediate observation
is that judicial precedents in civil law systems are less likely to satisfy the
conditions for efficiency than flexible stare decisis, given that in civil law
systems, the highest court must persuade the lower courts. However, a more
systematic analysis reveals the complexity of the problem. The rate of
litigation, the repetition of cases, and the preferences of the higher and lower
courts shape the process of establishing judicial precedents that could be
efficient under certain circumstances.278 Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess
the extent to which such circumstances are actually satisfied.279
272 Cf id. at 72-73.
273 Cf id. at 72.
274 Cf id. at71-72.
275 Cf id. at 73.
276 Cf id.
277 But see Fon & Parisi, supra note 139, for one of few such analyses.
278 Id. at 532 33.
279 Cf id. at 533.
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B. Economics of Certiorari
Legal economists have analyzed the writ of certiorari in the context of
regulating appeals. 280 The literature seems to conclude that some form of
procedural rules to limit access to the highest court is economically justified.
The arguments in favor of the writ of certiorari include:
(i) The court can focus on more meritorious cases since an earlier selection
of more meritorious cases for appeal is less costly in nature. 281
(ii) The writ of certiorari reduces the likelihood of wasting resources on
frivolous appeals since parties may anticipate they are unlikely to pass the
merit threshold to be admitted.282
(iii) The writ of certiorari promotes expediency in case law in two ways.
For those cases that are not admitted into court, it clarifies the obligations of
each party at an earlier stage.283 For those cases that are admitted into court,
the backlog is minimal and so they can be decided in a timely manner.284
Meanwhile, the arguments against the writ of certiorari include:
(i) Some legal errors might not ever be corrected because the court does not
reflect on them sufficiently when sorting out admission.285 However, the
appealing parties are under pressure to expose legal errors in a more
transparent and consistent way in order to convince the court that their case
passes the merit threshold for admission.286
280 See generally Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An
Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. Scl REv. 101 (2000); Steven
Shavell, On the Design of the Appeal Process: The Optimal Use of Discretionary Review versus Direct
Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (2010); Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2006); Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 379 (1995).
281 Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means ofError Correction, supra note 280, at 417.
282 Id
283 Cf. id. at 419 20.
284 See Oliveira, supra note 5, at 111.
285 Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, supra note 280, at 419 20.
286 id
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(ii) Petitions for certiorari increase group pressure costs to persuade the
court to grant certiorari. Such effect is likely to make the earlier stage of an
appeals process more costly.287
(iii) It enhances strategic judicial behavior on case selection to mold
decision-making in the court. Judges could use case selection to forge
coalitions, reveal preferences, or avoid difficult situations. 288
Some form of writ of certiorari is efficient for the reasons explained above.
The assessment, however, cannot escape the details. One needs to understand
the behavioral incentives provided by the court's internal bargaining with
respect to admission of an appeal. Inevitably it will depend on the extent to
which lower courts do a good job in avoiding gross legal errors. At the same
time, the court will be more exposed to external pressures, which could
potentially create some waste of resources in lobbying and persuasion.
Therefore the mechanisms by which a court deals with external pressure are
relevant in this context. It is likely that a court largely made of "recognition" 289
judges (such as in the common law world and in Brazil) reacts in a different
way than a court largely relying on career judges (as in most civil law courts).
Consequently we cannot understand economically a particular form of
certiorari without recognizing the institutional context.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE BRAZILIAN CASE
Both precedent and certiorari generate costs and benefits as the law and
economics literature has recognized. Generally speaking, we have seen how a
flexible precedent is more advantageous than either absolute precedent or no
precedent rules. A mechanism of certiorari is efficient if it allows the court to
focus on the more meritorious cases without imposing a burden in terms of
legal errors by lower courts.
Following our comparative law discussion, every legal system necessarily
has a body of previously decided cases and a set of rules to manage appeals,
287 James Lindgren & William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court's Extraordinary Powver to Grant
Certiorari ofAppeals, SUP. CT. REv. 259, 278-79 (1986).
288 Cf Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling Game, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 10 (2008).
289 Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Hybrid Judicial Career Structures: Reputation Versus Legal
Tradition, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411, 411 (2011) (defining a "recognition" judge as a "judge appointed later in
life in recognition of other career achievements").
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though they might differ in the practices they adopt relative to that body of
previously decided cases and those rules to manage appeals.
In fact, following previous insights, we could distinguish between the
strength and the scope of stare decisis. "Strength" reflects the necessary burden
for a court overturning a prior decision, while "scope" refers to the number of
cases considered "similar" and hence governed by the prior decision.290 Civil
law jurisdictions seem to favor a strong, narrow stare decisis while common
law jurisdictions tend to adopt a weak, broad stare decisis. Brazil seems to go
for a more unique combination.
Stimula vinculante, the Brazilian form of precedent, has some particularly
distinctive characteristics. In a direct comparison with the United States' stare
decisis, it is enforced in a more abstract context. Thus, we can say it provides
for a more flexible mechanism of precedent, but is potentially applicable to a
larger set of situations (for example, even when state laws are not directly
being litigated). It also has a broad enforcement, not just upon lower courts,
but also in reference to the federal, state, and municipal administrations.
The advantages from an economic perspective are quite standard:
enhancement of rule of law, reduction of frivolous claims, and improvement of
judicial decision-making. Two aspects deserve specific attention: court
creativity and reinforcement of court hierarchy.
When lower courts are creative and want to depart from precedent, there is
a cost in terms of developing legal argumentation. For each individual case, an
abstract approach presumably generates a less costly method of departure from
precedent than a concrete approach since it should be easier to establish the
necessary differences under the latter than under the former. However, an
abstract approach potentially applies to a more diverse set of situations and
cases. Therefore, it is not clear which system generates more costs.
The reinforcement of court hierarchy has structural legal properties that are
attractive from a law and economics perspective. The Supreme Court is the
appropriate venue for complex legal discussions without damaging legal
certainty. The political dimension of judicial lawmaking is more effective if
supervised by the Supreme Court, rather than left to confusing and opposing
decisions by the lower courts, particularly in relation to multiple claims filed
290 See Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 510-12.
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by different parties but similar in challenging the same substantive law.
Nevertheless, the cost of "verticalizing" the court system increases if lower
courts or if the administration rebel against the Supreme Court. Such cost is
not significant when a legal system is already reasonably "verticalized," as in
the United States, but could be important in a legal system more
"horizontalized," as in Brazil.29'
The response of the lower courts and of the administration to the sf2mula
vinculante should determine the extent to which the process of reinforcement
of court hierarchy is excessively costly. The evidence of the last four years
confirms a significant collaboration by lower courts beyond the standard
292
rhetoric. The implementation of these new mechanisms has required much
dialogue between the lower courts and the Supreme Court. Such dialogue
included meetings293 and the creation of a virtual forum on the internet294 to
directly connect courts to talk about the practical management problems in the
implementation of the general relevance test. This interaction is particularly
useful to solve common problems and to inform the Supreme Court about
multiple claims on the same subject matter on the lower courts' docket. As
explained before, when a case passes the relevance test, lower courts must hold
similar cases while waiting for the Supreme Court's decision. 295 Therefore, it is
important to map the most numerous similar cases so that the Supreme Court
can list the case for hearing with priority to disburden lower courts' dockets
from the most pressing cases. Indeed, lower courts apparently have incentives
to participate and dialogue in the implementation process of the relevance test.
One incentive is to influence how to achieve the most efficient proceedings to
manage this new mechanism. Most importantly, however, seems to be that a
potential lack of cooperation would end up basically shifting the burden of
heavy caseload of repetitive cases from the Supreme Court to lower courts,
without addressing a common goal, which is to expedite justice and address
long delays in case disposal before the judiciary.
291 In reference to absence of rigid precedent constraining lower courts.
292 For the argument against limiting the creativity of the lower courts, see Arantes, supra note 6.
293 Representatives of the federal and state appellate courts, as well as of the higher courts, came together
during a seminar entitled Repercussdo Geral em Evolugdo , which was organized by the Supreme Court and
the Ministry of Justice in November 2010. Noticias STF, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL (December 20, 2010),
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=168521.
294 Noticias STF, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www\.stf.jus.br/portal/ems/
verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=173944.
295 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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As with the writ of certiorari, the mechanism of requisito da repercussdo
geral restricts appeals, but the management by lower courts (in terms of
defining the criteria to establish when claims are "similar") reduces the
probability of significant legal errors. The Brazilian system seems more
appropriate for minimizing the potential costs of not reviewing all appeals
since the lower courts have an active role in choosing relevant cases to be
presented to the Court for the requisito da repercussdo geral; every
representative case has more chance to be addressed by the Supreme Court
under the Brazilian system than under certiorari.
At the same time, the introduction of the requisito da repercussdo geral has
apparently not changed political bargaining dramatically. Due to the
accumulated backlog from the years before the reform, the Supreme Court
decided to admit the repercussdo geral mechanism in relation to multiple cases
even when the Court had already consistently decided the controversy at issue.
During the current transition from the previous system to the new general
interest mechanism, the Court's choice has been to augment the number of
cases with general interest in order to dispose of similar old cases more
efficiently. Since the implementation of the general interest mechanism in
2007 until 2011, the Supreme Court analyzed 521 requests of general
296importance. Out of these 521 cases, 377 (or 72.36%) were admitted, and
only 144 (27.64%) were found inadmissible for lack of general interest.297 This
policy can also be explained by the legal culture embedded in civil law
traditions, where there is no practice of political bargaining in the admissibility
of cases.
In theory, it is yet unclear how the Brazilian design will affect strategic
judicial behavior in the Supreme Court. It could be used to force preference
revelation, as it does in the United States, but at the same time since the
"modal" cases are decided by lower courts, there is less room for Brazilian
Supreme Court Justices to influence the substance of their dockets than there is
for U.S. Supreme Court Justices to influence the substance of their dockets.
The general perception seems to be that not much has changed in terms of
behavior in the Brazilian Supreme Court, confirming that the mechanism of
requisito da repercussdo geral has not provided for the ideal framework to
develop the standard political bargaining we observe in the U.S. Supreme
296 See supra tbl. 4.
297 id.
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Court. Such perception however can only be confirmed, if so, in years to come.
More precisely, when the backlog becomes minimal and the practice of this
new requirement is consolidated.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed two recent fundamental developments in Brazilian
constitutional law: the introduction of precedent in concrete review (simula
vinculante) and the possibility of rejecting appeals if they do not satisfy a
standard of general interest (requisito da repercussao geral). They are
significantly different from the United States' principles of stare decisis and
writ of certiorari. At the same time, they are definitively more substantive than
equivalent institutions available in civil law systems. We have argued that,
from a law and economics perspective, both mechanisms are likely to enhance
the benefits of rule of law, legal certainty, and reduction of frivolous litigation
and of court delays, without significantly incurring the standard costs of legal
errors.
